Since the inception of socialist China, the concept of citizenship seemed to be based largely on a corporatist view, in which citizens are defined by class and belong to collectivist social groups encouraged and promoted by the state. Women have been encouraged to think of themselves as workers, party members (of the CCP), members of youth groups (Youth League), or members of women's associations (such as the All China Women's Federation). 7 Since the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, however, a number of social developments, most significantly the development of a market-oriented economy and a marked increase in migration within China, began to change 8 these views.
The 1990s also witnessed an increase in the use of formal civil litigation in the Chinese courts, and a decrease in the use of informal dispute resolution, such as mediation by neighborhood committees and the work units. 9 While community and group identity certainly have not disappeared, and community forms of dispute resolution still exist and are utilized, the increasing use of formal dispute resolution through court adjudication may have promoted a more individualized concept of citizenship. This is evident in the individualization and privatization of family and personal relations, exemplified by female litigants turning to the courts in divorce petitions. In turn, the courts are treating these divorce petitions as individual disputes between private parties instead of disputes between families and communities.
These trends, however, present some significant problems for female divorce litigants. In the public sphere of courts, where the private matter of divorce is litigated, the culture of transition breeds a confluence of tensions.1°W hen in court, female litigants are asked to act less like members of collectivist groups and more like individuals, with all the attendant benefits and pitfalls of asserting individual rights. Thus, the divorce litigation process may be heightening women's sense of individual entitlement, but at the same time, lowering women's sense of collective well-being.
Several factors have contributed to this process, including economic reforms, geographical migration of women, migration by women from the public to the private sector, marriage law reform, and other social reforms. I will discuss each of these factors at length.
II. How RECENT ECONOMIC REFORMS ARE SHAPING WOMEN'S OPPORTUNITIES AND EXPERIENCES
As economic reforms and reliance on the market deepen, Chinese women's social status has increased in some ways, but decreased in others." Since the start of China's economic reforms and its re-entry into the global economy in the 1980s, a number of social problems have emerged or reemerged, which threaten Chinese women's status and well-being, including their rights as equal citizens in the Chinese state. 12 While the market-oriented economy has offered women greater mobility and freedom, such mobility has also resulted in greater threats for women at home and in the workplace. 13 As I have written previously, 14 the problems may be traced to a "commodification of the feminine" and take form in two contrasting trends.
First, there has been a geographical migration in which Chinese women are traveling out of their localities for labor and for marriage, thereby transcending the local in favor of the regional and national. Is Second, there has been a publicto private-sector migration, in which female workers are encouraged to leave the state-sector workplace and enter the private sphere of the home and hearth. 16 Both of these trends have resulted in greater isolation for women, higher incidence of poor health and suicide, greater threats of violence against women both in the family and the workplace, and greater family instability, including higher rates of divorce. 17
A. The Geographical Migration
The first of these trends, the outward migration of Chinese women from local to regional to national, is a recent phenomenon.' 8 Over the past decade, China has literally become a nation in migration; Chinese sources report that I1. See [Vol. 15: 99 close to 40 million women have given up farming for industrial-sector labor.' 9 Among these millions are the women, collectively known as dagongmei [laboring sisters], who have migrated to cities for work within the exploding numbers of foreign-invested, township, and privately-owned enterprises. 2°F emale workers constitute the majority of migrant workers in the explosion of these enterprises, which have been the focus of economic reforms. In some factories in the special economic zones, they constitute ninety percent of the labor force. 2 
'
By placing young, uneducated rural women under the authority of urban male supervisors, this outward labor migration renders women especially vulnerable to male exploitation, particularly economic and sexual abuse. 22 Moreover, since these migrating women often take non-contractual, less desirable, temporary jobs without urban residence registration, they work 23 without the social benefits normally guaranteed to state workers.
While it may be argued that such jobs are better than no jobs at all, these jobs create societal stratification, with female workers consistently on the bottom rung. The combination of abusive bosses and limited state benefits thus subjects women to poor working conditions, discrimination, sexual abuse, and harassment. 24 Even in the best circumstances, out-migrating women cannot significantly draw on the support of their natal families, resulting in greater isolation and risk of abuse. This is particularly salient for rural women, who migrate outward from poor inner rural areas to more prosperous regional centers for marriage. 25
26
Indeed, about thirty percent of Chinese women who migrate do so to marry. This migration is fueled by the resurgent practice of buying and selling rural women as brides, a practice the government disapproves of, but is unable to halt. At China's borders, where supplies are the highest, a young woman can 19. China; Country Gender Review, E. ASIA ENVTL & Soc. DEV. UNIT, WORLD BANK, June 2002, at 15, available at www.worldbank.org.cn/English/content/gender-en.pdf. By the 1990s, close to 70million rural people had migrated to the cities for jobs, about two thirds of them men and one third women. In 2001, the estimated migrant population was 105 million. See also Zhang Ye, Migrant Women Workers and the Emerging Civil Society in China, ASIA FOUND., 2001 (noting that the 2000 national population census estimated that more than sixty percent of the over ten-million migrant laborers in Guangdong Province were women). 20. Pun Ngai, supra note 13, at 1-20. 21 
B. The Public Sector Migration
The second form of migration taking place in China is the reverse migration of women from the public to the private sphere. This has resulted in a decline in women's participation in the formal political sphere workplace. 3°C hina's economic reforms have led to redundancies in the workforce, with female workers bearing the brunt of this change. 31 Women are often the last to be hired and first to be laid off. 32 By the end of 1997, about fifty-three percent of the 5.768 million jobless people who had registered with their local governments were women. 33 only seventy percent of men's pay, a sharp decrease from the eighty-three percent they earned in 1990. 37 Women also comprised less than twelve percent of the country's managers in 1997 .
C. Private Sector Migration
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, substantial rhetoric from official media developed, which encouraged women to serve the state by returning to the home and hearth. 39 The expanding market-oriented economy further fueled this reverse migration by increasingly commodifying women as beauty objects.
As beauty objects, women are viewed as consumers as well as products, who are relegated to the roles of wives and mistresses, rather than assuming roles as equal workers "holding up half the sky,", 40 as they supposedly did during the Mao era.4' This view has led women to be valued simply for their youth and beauty and serves as a justification for denying them employment: in many cases, women at forty have been termed "too old" or "too fat" to be hired. 42 The relocation of women to the private sphere of the home may be adding to women's vulnerability to violence and loss of financial autonomy. 163-69 (1993) . The rhetoric appearing in official media promoted women's domestic role as "good, natural, [and] inevitable," and encouraged them to "return home" to serve socialism as mothers and housewives. The argument given in support of this new idea was that there was a need for "women going home in the initial stage of socialism,. . . women engaged in home duties in a kind of division of labor in society .... [ 40. Under Maoist interpretation of Marxist theory, women's liberation necessarily depended on women's full and equal participation in social production. The underlying assumption was that entry into the wage labor force would improve women's conditions and thus raise their confidence, power, and authority in both the public and domestic spheres. To address the inequality of women, the new government of the People's Republic of China quickly adopted a four-pronged strategy to "legislate for equality, introduce women into social production, introduce a new ideology of equality, and organize women to both redefine and forward their economic, social and political interests." ELISABETH CROLL, CHINESE WOMEN SINCE MAO 1 (1983).
See
Woo, supra note 39, at 148-51. 42. These biases run so deep that many women seem to share their culture's low opinion of themselves. Hence, Yang Xiyuan, a retired lawyer in Beijing, confided, "I met laid-offwomen workers from a textile factory who were given new jobs in a bank, but they learned too slowly. They were all in their forties, so their reactions were not very quick. They just couldn't do it fast enough." Rosenthal, supra note 36, at Al.
43. According to a recent study by the All China Women's Federation, domestic violence is a factor in 50-60% of divorce cases. Ying Mingque Guiding Zhizhi Jiating Baoli-Quanguo Fulian Xiugai Beijing Society for Research on Marriage and the Family, one fifth of the wives 44 among the 2,100 families surveyed had been abused by their spouses. Reports of extramarital affairs have grown, as has the number of divorces. 45 
III. WOMEN'S CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AS DEFINED THROUGH THE MARRIAGE

LAWS
The economic and physical migration of women has increased their geographical dislocation and correspondingly impacted their social identities. This has reflected itself in the way women view marriage, their role in the family, and their role vis a vis the state as they attempt to maneuver through the regulations dealing with marriage and divorce.
A. The Impact of the Marriage Law of 1950 and Other Cultural Reforms on Traditional Chinese Marriage Customs
In traditional China, marriage was the result of an agreement between two 46 families rather than between two individuals. Similarly, divorce was also a matter negotiated by the families. 4 7 This pattern began to change when the newly-established People's Republic instituted the Marriage Law of 1950.48 As one of the first laws implemented by the newly-established communist state, the 1950 Marriage Law broke with tradition by terminating the practice of arranged marriages and empowering women to initiate divorce proceedings.
In the process, the state replaced the family as the decision-maker, and reformulated the purpose of marriage in distinctly socialist terms, thereby impacting the rationales acceptable for initiating divorce. The 1950 Marriage Law granted some freedom to women from abusive marriages but primarily enabled them to take on the new status of socialist citizens. Thus, in every divorce decision during this era, one finds the class status of the person concemed listed behind their names. 49 Article 8 of the 1950 Marriage Law even stated the purpose of the law to be that spouses would form a family in the service of the "new society". 5° During this period, divorces based on anti-feudal reasons were likely to be granted, while divorces not related to feudal concems were usually mediated and denied .
The nascent institutional and social sanction of divorce, however, proved short lived. The practice of granting divorces flourished only from 1950 to late 1953, and subsequently remained dormant until at least 1979.52 After the promulgation of a new constitution in 1954, it was believed that divorces were no longer socially necessary, as it was assumed that all feudal marriages had been terminated and that new marriage contracts were consensual. 53 Furthermore, the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) 54 represented a period of more conservative sexual mores, in which "careful" divorces and marriages, and "proper" family relations took center stage. 55 Divorces were seen as failures in the socialist project and thus discouraged.
Beginning in the early period of PRC history, the work unit displaced the family, much as loyalty to nation and state was placed above allegiance to family, and ideas about nationalism and nation-building replaced family authority and interests. 56 Marriage and divorce became very much politicized as "the state tried to use new family regulations and other incentives to mold a new sort of citizen and the relationship between the family and the state." ' People were even instructed to consider the broader political implications of their decisions regarding marriage and the family. 58 Divorce was not a decision to be based on one's personal and private individual happiness. Instead, divorce needed to advance the greater goals of the socialist collective, and be considered within the broader context of existing political campaigns.
Thus, despite its initial liberating effect for women, the 1950 Marriage Law subsequently subjected marriage and divorce to political interpretations, providing divorce only when there was a "proper" reason. 59 The All China Women's Federation, foresake its former role as an advocate for residents seeking assistance with family disputes, to give high priority to producing ideology and propaganda. 6° Women, more so among urban elites than the rural population, came to believe that divorces were more damaging to their interests than remaining married, except when they needed a political divorce from a spouse who was deemed to be counterrevolutionary. The state approach to divorce altered once again, however, with the end of the Cultural Revolution, which marked the beginning of a period of economic and legal reform. In 1978, along with the development of a market-oriented 58. Id. 59. While Article 17 of the 1950 Marriage Act provided for a divorce when both parties "desired it," the reality was that contested divorces were sought and granted based on "proper" reasons, which fluctuated with official campaigns and rhetoric, ranging from feudal considerations in the early 1950s to "proper" sexual mores in the Cultural Revolution. Thus non-economic laws to be implemented during this reform. It provided for divorce upon a showing that "ganqing puolie" "[emotions or mutual affections were broken]". 67 This standard for divorce in theory enabled parties to seek a divorce without a showing of any social or political misconduct, and more pointedly, focused the granting of divorce on the deteriorating relationship between the individual parties themselves, instead of the relationship between the individual and the state. In practice, however, petitions for divorce on the grounds of "broken emotions" encountered conceptual difficulties that hindered women's abilities to initiate divorce under the doctrine. Finally, in 1989, the Supreme People's Court issued several guidelines, clarifying what the lower courts should consider when assessing whether the marital emotions are broken. The Supreme People's Court outlined the following considerations to be weighed: 1) the foundation of marriagewhether it was voluntarily or arranged; 2) relations after the marriage; 3) the reason for divorcewhether there was fault on the part of the defending party; and 4) the possibility of reconciliation. 68 Once the parameters of the "broken emotions" doctrine were elucidated, divorce petitions skyrocketed. The divorce rate in big cities soared from three percent in 1978 to close to twenty percent in 1995.69 (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) , supra note 66, at 187. Although "emotions or mutual affections were broken" is a more complete translation of the Chinese phrase "ganqing puolie", I hereinafter use the shorter form "emotions were broken" for simplicity.
See Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the l1th Chinese Communist Party Central
In the debates surrounding the 2001 amended Marriage Law, there was some discussion about changing the "breakdown of emotions" standard to a "breakdown of the marital relationship" standard. 
B. Social Reform and Its Effects on the Lives of Women
On paper, the laws relating to family and marriage appear favorable to Chinese women, although their flawed implementation compromises their effectiveness. Both the Women's Rights Law and the Marriage Law guarantee the freedom to marry and divorce. v In a divorce, these laws specify that special consideration should be given to women and children in the division of property and housing. 71 For example, Article 31 of the Marriage Law stipulates that the division of the couple's shared property should be handled through consultation, with the court making judgments on a case-by-case basis, while 1 ,,72 "giving special care to the wife and children's interests.
The 1980 and 2001 Marriage Laws even prohibit "the husband from filing for divorce during the wife's pregnancy or within a year of delivery., 7 3 Similarly, the Women's Rights Law stipulates that "women have exactly the same rights as their spouses to occupy, use, benefit from, and dispose of all shared property, whatever their income." 74 This legal protection is especially necessary for women who, upon marriage, face discrimination in the distribution of valuable housing and village land rights. Nevertheless, divorced women continue to be left without property or housing.
In theory, the divorce process itself is relatively simple, but in actuality, the divorce process reflects the changing view that divorce is both a community matter and a private matter between private individuals. There are two methods for obtaining divorce in China, the xieyi [agreement] system and the more formal court system. The degree to which each is availed of by divorce petitioners illustrates the changing perceptions of divorce and the legal system, since each method provides its own perceived advantages and disadvantages.
The xieyi system can be quicker and easier for less-complicated divorces; however, many couples shy away from the xieyi system because it requires tat they hand over their personal problems to their work units and other local organizations involved in mediation. Under the xieyi system, the parties, if they both agree, can simply file for a divorce by seeking permission from the marriage registration office of the Bureau of Civil Affairs, located at their place of residence. 75 (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) , supra note 66.
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bring their request to the marriage registration office along with their identification, residence card, an introduction letter from their work unit or residence committee, and their marriage certificate. 76 The registration office must give an answer within a month, but will first conduct informal mediation, counseling, and/or education for the petitioning couple. 77 If reconciliation after mediation is unlikely, a divorce will be granted. Until recently, most couples preferred the xieyi system over court litigation when seeking a divorce. Couples increasingly have been turning to the courts as an alternative to the xieyi system to divorce, to protect their privacy by avoiding excessive mediation and intrusive involvement of community organizations. 78 Even in the courts, however, divorce petitions must first be mediated under court authorities, and sometimes with the involvement of relevant units, such as the parties' work units, labor unions, or women's federation. 79 In theory, this mediation step is voluntary. 80 During mediation, courts are to investigate the case and try to reconcile the parties before making a judicial determination. 8 1 If reconciliation is not possible, the court then proceeds to rule on the divorce 82 petition, including ruling on the division of property between the parties. Parties dissatisfied with the court judgment may appeal to a court of the next level within fifteen days. 83 These processes for divorce remain unchanged under the 2001 amendments to China's Marriage Law. 84 However, as will be discussed later, the newly amended Marriage Law did attempt to address some of the problems faced by women as individual litigants in contested divorces. 85 grounds for divorce, determined what constitutes joint property, and identified parental custody and visitation rights. It also brought back community norms of fault by punishing at-fault parties in divorce and providing victims with the right to sue for compensation and the division of property.
IV. THE VOICES OF CHINESE LITIGANTS
From 1979 to 1989, the rate of Chinese divorces more than doubled, with urban areas experiencing an even more dramatic increase in divorce rates. 86 The divorce rate continued to rise between 1991 and 1995 in China's major cities. According to Chinese social scientist Xu Anqi, a leading expert on Chinese marriage and divorce, the divorce rate rose in Shanghai from 17.7% to 28%; in Beijing from 16.6% to 23.8%; and in Tianjin from 9% to 17.3%." In the most recent years for which survey data is available, 1997 through 2001, the number of divorce cases in the Chinese courts increased by 14.2% from the previous five years.s
As discussed earlier, divorces are increasingly being litigated in the courts rather than being resolved administratively and informally, and private litigants are going to court in growing numbers. For example, between 1997 and 2001, civil litigation increased by 37.3% from the previous five-year period, with housing, divorce, family, and debt cases constituting the largest categories of cases on the civil docket. 89
A. Ground-level Study of Divorce in China
Previously-cited statistical and other large-scale research endeavors highlight the profound changes currently occurring within the Chinese legal system. But how are individual women experiencing these transformations? In (clarifying property rights); and art. 47 (punishing at-fault parties for concealing marital property), available at www.isolaw.com./jsp;law/LAW-Chapters.jsp?CatID=277&LanglD=0&StatutesID.
86. In Shanghai, the divorce rate grew more than fivefold; in Beijing and Tianjin, it grew more than threefold. Xu Anqui, The Marriage Trends in Our Cities, SOC. STUD. 3, 41-45 (1991).
87. In general, urban divorce rates are much higher than those in rural areas. Even though the rate of increase in divorce was quite high in the 1980s, the relative rate of divorce in world terms remained fairly low. It was not until the late 1980s that the relative rate started to take off, with the Muslim areas of Xinjiang province producing rates that are almost as high as those in the United States. [Vol. 15: 99
Shaping Citizenship 1998, this author and historian Christina Gilmartin went to Shanghai to explore the reality behind these statistics from the perspective of several disciplines: history, women's studies, and law. 90 Different kinds of data were collected using a variety of research approaches, including documentary research, ethnography, interviews, and case studies. We believe that a combination of methods paints a more complete picture of the status of women in the divorce process in contemporary China. 9 ' We interviewed twenty-nine divorce litigants from different areas of Shanghai and different sectors of society. We chose to conduct qualitative interviews because we believed that for a topic as intimate as marriage and divorce, detailed interviews would yield insights that could not be gained by other means. Each of our interviews took approximately three hours. 92 Of our twenty-nine interviewees, twenty were women and nine were men. We included male as well as female divorcees for a more complete picture. The interviewees were drawn from referrals as well as from visits to the numerous clubs for divorcees that are now springing up all over Shanghai. 93 Our interviewees ranged in age from twenty-nine to sixty-four years old. Their lengths of marriages ranged from less than one year to thirty-five years. All of the interviewees had received some formal education. Nineteen of them had completed at least middle to high school and/or vocational training, while ten of the interviewees were university graduates. Six of the interviewees obtained their divorces through the informal xieyi system, and twenty-two through the more formal court process.
In one case, we were able to interview all parties involved in the divorce proceeding, including the litigants, the judge, and the lawyer. 94 In another case, we were able to speak with the defendant and his lawyer, and received access to the entire case file. 95 To supplement our interview data, we also interviewed court officials, lawyers, and administrators from the Bureau of Civil Affairs, as well as Chinese legal scholars in the area of family law. Taken together, the data provide insights regarding two critical thematic areasthe state of divorces and family formation in urban China, and the legal process facing female litigants in urban China today. 90 . This author is a legal specialist who has written primarily about the Chinese legal system, while Christina Gilmartin has written extensively on gender and politics in twentieth-century China. 
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B. The Who, What, How and Why of Urban Chinese Divorce
Who is petitioning for a divorce in the courts? In our interview group, women were plaintiffs in twenty cases and men were plaintiffs in nine cases. This is consistent with national statistics, as well as Shanghai's own statistics, which reveal that women are usually the initiators of divorce petitions. 96 One court official we interviewed estimated that female plaintiffs in divorce cases constitute seventy percent of the divorce cases filed in Shanghai. 97 In Zha Bei District Court alone, our sources estimated that divorce petitions constituted more than half of the caseload, with female plaintiffs in ninety percent of the cases. 98 Nationally, according to the statistics of the Supreme People's Court, women were the petitioners in nearly seventy percent of the divorce cases tried by the civil courts since 1980. 99 Interestingly, then, women are taking the initiative in the vast majority of the divorce cases filed in China.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that women wish to divorce more than men. According to our interviewees, some women initiate divorce because they do not want to be perceived as "victims" or they think it would be in their best interest to take proactive steps. According to one woman, initiating a divorce was a way to take charge of the situation, and she expressed relief at taking herself out of a bad marriage and starting anew. 1 00 In this most private of all issues, Chinese women, at least in urban areas such as Shanghai, are stepping forward to claim their legal right to marital freedom.
C. The Effects of Education on Chinese Women 's Decisions to Divorce
Modernization theories generally posit that education and economic development necessarily lead to greater assertion of rights. 10 ' These theories assume that people with less education might be less inclined to assert their rights, seek the assistance of a lawyer, or otherwise use formal court processes. While not randomly chosen or statistically significant, all of the interviewees in our study had at least a middle school or above education.°2 Perhaps some minimal form of education may be necessary before one feels empowered to assert one's rights sufficiently. 96 [Vol. 15: 99
Shaping Citizenship
At the same time, conversations with our interviewees allow us to hypothesize that too much education may work in the reverse, at least in Shanghai. Though one might expect intellectuals 0 3 to be more aware of their rights and thus more active in bringing suit, this may not be true. Intellectuals may feel more bound by traditional precepts and more hesitant to resort to the "uncivil" conduct of litigation, while workers may be more inclined to use lawyers and the formal legal process because they feel powerless and need the court for protection. 0 4 At least two of the ten university-educated interviewees expressed the belief that it was more "civilized" to settle the matter privately, quietly, and without controversy.1 05 Since courts can provide more anonymity than xieyi divorces, these educated litigants would go to court, but would not "fight" over property or other issues. One university-educated litigant even expressed the view that lawyer involvement represents a failure of sorts. 0 6
D. Women's Financial Independence is Linked with the Decision to Divorce
Financial independence may prove a significant factor in Chinese women's decisions to bring suit. Many divorces are obtained by women of working age. Of the divorce litigants we interviewed, female initiators of divorce ranged in age from twenty-nine to forty-eight. Members of the Jiading district of Shanghai women's federation estimated that the bulk of divorce litigants ranged in age from twenty to forty.°7 As Professor Li Weisha notes, litigants tend to be those who "have their own income and are able to lead an independent life. [T]hese women are imperceptibly influenced every day by traditional culture, including traditional ideas on marriage... [and] they show a strong and nontraditional inclination for self-determination."' 1 8 Market reforms and the resultant migratory trends have led to a limited measure of financial autonomy and freedom for Chinese women, which has made it possible for some to "buy out" of unhappy marriages. 1°9
E. Interviewees'Reasons for Divorce
In today's China, the reasons people choose to divorce show that expectations about love, marriage, and individual self-fulfillment appear increasingly important. According to national studies, the main grounds for divorce include bigamy, adultery, addiction to drinking and gambling, and long-time working abroad." 0 These grounds present failures in personal relationships, rather than political ones.
Our interviewees offer a more close-up look at the reasons people seek divorce. We found that of the twenty petitions brought by women, seven explicitly cited domestic violence and two cited abandonment as motivations for pursuing divorce. The rest pointed to reasons of incompatibility [xingge buhe], or more frequently, extramarital affairs.
With increasing economic freedom and the withdrawal of the Chinese state from people's private lives, China is seeing a rise in reports of extramarital affairs. This is reflected in the changing terminology from "meddling in marriages" to "the third party" to "love outside the marriage.""' In one urban district, the Jiading District of Shanghai, members of the Jiading Women's Federation that we interviewed said the divorce rate in 1997 exceeded the marriage rate. 12 They also believed extramarital affairs motivated divorce in over half of these cases." 3 While reports of extramarital affairs have grown, so, too, have reports of family violence. According to a study by the All China Women's Federation, domestic violence may be a factor in thirty percent of Chinese families, and fifty to sixty percent of all divorces. 14 Domestic violence, however, was not the major factor for the divorce litigants we interviewedonly one factor of many. This may be because domestic violence is still viewed as a problem that requires education, not divorce.
There is an increasing recognition that personality and emotional wellbeing can be key reasons for divorce. Today, marriage for free love is 110. Li Xiaohua, supra note 43. [Vol. 15: 99 overtaking arranged marriages and even "intermediary" marriages (marriage through matchmakers).
Yang
In the economically-developed southeast, the proportion of marriages based on free love is higher than seventy percent, and arranged marriages no longer exist." 1 5 In sum, reform and greater freedom have led not only to possibilities of greater chasms in relations, but also to greater expectations for what a marriage should be and a growing sense of entitlement that those expectations be met.
It is important to note, however, that while seeking a divorce is no longer difficult for Chinese urban women, the same may not be the case for Chinese women in rural areas. In underdeveloped areas, arranged marriages still comprise the majority of marriages. Chinese women in rural areas still face substantial interference with their legal rights. According to an investigation of the Wulian Court in Shangdong Province, husbands and/or relatives "interfered with" at least eighty-four cases, or 27.6%, of the 308 divorce cases tried by the court.'1 6 The methods of obstruction ranged from the threat or use of direct force, to instances of jailing, binding or holding the women in custody.
V. PROBLEMS OF PROPERTY AND HOUSING DIVISION FOR FEMALE DIVORCE LITIGANTS
In their divorce petitions, the women we interviewed asserted not only their right to marriage and divorce, but also their equal right to marital property and child custody. Yet, despite legal protections on paper, in practice, women can suffer both financial and emotional setbacks in a divorce because they often receive the short end of property and housing divisions.
The housing problem for women in divorce is attributable to a combination of factors, including housing shortages, residual effects of the work-unit housing allocation system, and traditional virilocal patterns of residence after marriage, in which women live with or near the husband's family after marriage. Until recently, most housing was distributed by the work units, which under the rationale of avoiding double allocation, often refused to allocate housing to married women. Under this distribution system, women received fewer housing vouchers and were ineligible for newly constructed homes. 1 17 Furthermore, as women workers were often the first to be fired and last to be hired, women also faced early retirement or unemployment. Unemployment, in turn, has meant that women were least financially able to 
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have independent housing or to be affiliated with a work unit, which could provide housing.
According to a recent study on housing and divorce in the state sector, where public housing allocation is most likely to occur, husbands are 2.6 percent more likely to receive housing than wives.' 1 8 Under a system of stateallocated housing, divorces were and are an administrative nuisance, as work units cannot command additional housing units to meet the demands of a divorce. Thus, until well into the 1990s, the role of the work units in a couple's marital living situation was such that "many or most court and civil affairs offices required a letter of permission from the spouses' work unit before they would process the divorce request, even when the couple was in agreement."' 19 Property and especially housing have often become bargaining chips in contested divorces. More than one female interviewee mentioned facing pressure to compromise and give up rightful property before the other party agreed to the divorce.' 20 This is problematic, as women need housing in order to enjoy freedom. As Irene Tinker observes, "To survive in this rapidly changing socioeconomic milieu, women need the security of land and house to provide income and shelter for their children, and they need the power to control who shares the house."' 12 ' Thus, the fastest divorces are often those with minimal property and/or housing disputes. These cases are funneled through the administrative xieyi system, with the parties registering their divorce agreement with the marriage registration office of the Bureau of Civil Affairs. Some of the most difficult divorce cases deal with the division of housing, and consequently, require legal assistance and are handled in the courts. 122 This includes a significant proportion of all divorces; close to thirty percent of the women who go to the Beijing University Center for Women's Law Studies and Legal Services for assistance with their divorces raise concerns related to their housing.
Our interviewees with no housing problems received divorces quickly, with minimal assistance. 126 This 1996 directive sets forth clearer guidelines to determine who can be awarded rental rights in public housing after divorce. 127 It gives both divorced parties the right to lease the public housing in which the couple has lived if "one of the parties leased the public housing before marriage, and the marital nexus has lasted for five years or more,"' 128 or if "one or both parties applied and acquired the right to lease the public housing after marriage."' 129 The directive urges courts to consider equity when dividing common housing by requiring a living allowance or requiring both people to live in the shared home for up to two years after divorce while they arrange for other housing. 130 This has proven to be a problem in instances of domestic violence, where the victim must share housing with the batterer.
The directive also urges the courts to consider the needs of women in the division of property.' 31 Yet, although the directive emphasizes equitable division of common housing rental rights, in reality those rights ultimately belong to the work units, which have been known to interfere with women's legal rights by avoiding the transfer of homes. 132 As Ann Jordan notes, as long as housing remains a work-related benefit, the divorce provisions contained in the Marriage Law and the Women's Rights Law will be ineffective.' 33 The recent movement to privatize the housing market has not entirely eliminated the problem of housing for female divorc6es. Despite its recent efforts in housing reforms, 134 133. Jordan, supra note 117, at 73-74. 134. Housing reform in Shanghai came in two stages. In 1980 and 1990, two main measures were taken. The first transferred responsibility from state and local governments to businesses that invested in housing construction and offered commercial housing to the public. The second began on February 8, 1991, under the Shanghai government's Executive Plan of Housing System Reform in Shanghai, which used a public accumulation fund paid by staff and workers in cities and work units; raised rents and gave shortages. 35 Similarly, an investigation in the Dongchen District of Shanghai in 1997 concluded that in ten sub-districts, 61.1% of divorced women lacked housing. 136 A. The Case ofZandL Z and L were middle-school classmates who married in 1983, and had a daughter the following year. In 1997, after fourteen years of marriage, L filed for divorce. As grounds for the divorce, L claimed domestic violence by Z, as well as "broken marital emotions," pursuant to the 1980 Marriage Law. In support of her petition, L alleged that her husband frequently beat her, even in the month after she gave birth. In 1993, L sought the assistance of her work subsidies; rationalized housing with bonds (requiring staff and workers to buy housing construction bonds when renting public housing); and sold preferential housing, which work units must sell before renting at preferential prices. Fei Juanhong, Impacts of Shanghai Housing Reform, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS TO HOUSE AND LAND: CHINA, LAOS, VIETNAM 198-199, supra note 121.
135. Limited housing in the 1970s to early 1980s led to a dramatic increase of virilocal residence (women living with the husband's family), exceeding even the rates from before 1949. Since housing reform took place in the 1980s, the percentage of unilocal residence has risen again. Id. at 196-97.
136. While the average living space per capita in Shanghai proper grew from 3.9 square meters in 1949 to 8.5 square meters in 1996, 61,500 families in Shanghai still had an average living space per capita under 4 square meters in 1995, and many newly-married couples were in urgent need of housing. Since housing tends to be small, it is rarely practical to divide a house up into more than one smaller residence. Even the recent reform in the commodification of housing does not help women, since the rent is so high as to be prohibitive for many people. Since women earn less than men, it is more difficult for them to purchase housing. Fei Juanhong, supra note 134, at 205. 1978) . 139. Z is interviewee S-13. We interviewed both him and his lawyer and had access to his court documents. See interviews with S-13 and his lawyer, supra note 95. The following case study is an accurate description of his divorce experience, based on these sources.
[Vol. 15: 99 unit, which tried to mediate the dispute by issuing a document to the defendant directing him to refrain from abuse. The document was enclosed as evidence in the divorce petition. In the latter half of 1996, Z developed a habit of going to saunas and, when L objected, would hit her. On May 2, 1997, L alleged that the defendant beat their fourteen-year-old daughter when she accidentally broke a rice bowl. L additionally alleged abuse on May 5, when she claimed Z beat her when she was too tired to clean the house. L sought custody of her daughter, child support payments of RMB 300 yuan (approximately $31) a month, as well as proper distribution of marital property, including the couple's apartment.
The defendant, L's husband Z, did not contest the divorce or custody of his daughter, but did contest the division of property. In his response, Z challenged the distribution of the marital property and alleged that L had engaged in domestic abuse of his elderly great aunt. Z's great aunt Y also intervened as third party to object to certain property (an air conditioner, a heater, an easy chair, a telephone, and a pager) being designated as marital property. Y maintained that she paid for these items herself, and thus they remained her property.
The divorce process began when the court telephoned Z at his home to notify him of the petition. Z picked up the divorce petition on June 9, 1997. A day later, on June 10, two judges spent one hour with the family cataloguing the household property. On June 18, the parties had a two-hour hearing with one judge and one secretary present. At that meeting, a representative of L's work unit testified. Relatives of both parties were also present. Z brought a lawyer and his brother-in-law, and L brought a representative from her work unit and a former classmate. There was some minimal effort to mediate the matter by the court. The judge simply asked if the parties agreed on the divorce and, since they did, moved quickly to discuss the division of property.
Because the parties could not agree on a property division, subsequent hearings were held on September 29, and again on November 27. The allocation of the family apartment, which was still occupied by Z, L, their daughter, and Z's great-aunt Y, proved to be a bitterly-contested issue. The apartment consisted of four rooms: one room (8.9 square meters) on the first floor, plus three rooms on the second floor: a southwest room (8.7 square meters), a middle south room (23.7 square meters), and a north room (16.4 square meters). The landing, kitchen, bathroom, and balcony were considered to be common spaces.
By the time a decision was rendered on Dec. 29, both parties had retained lawyers. Citing articles 25, 29, 30, and 31 of the Marriage Law, the district court awarded the divorce and made the following findings. The court awarded custody of the daughter to L and ordered Z to pay monthly child support of 300 yuan. The contested property (air conditioner, heater, easy chair, telephone and pager, etc.) was deemed marital property because Y was not able to provide receipts to prove ownership. Nevertheless, Z and L agreed to give the easy chair and heater to Y. After investigation, the district court found that the apartment had originally belonged to Z's grandmother, and that Z inherited the apartment in 1993 after her death. In dividing the property, the court awarded the first-floor room (8.9 square meters) and the second-floor southwest room (8.7 square meters) to L and her daughter. Z and his mother received the middle south room (23.7 square meters) and the north room (16.4 square meters). The court then awarded the remaining property, including an eightpiece redwood furniture set, to Z, but ordered Z to pay 20,000 yuan to L in compensation.
L filed a timely appeal in which she contested the division of the apartment and furniture. L argued that the apartment had been unfairly divided because she and her daughter were awarded the two smallest rooms, totally 17.6 square meters, with Z's rooms totalling 23 square meters more than L's. L sought a redivision, in which the north room (16.4 square meters) and the southwest room (8.9 square meters) went to L, and the central south room (23.7 square meters) and the southwest room (8.7 square meters) went to Z. The present division, argued L, deprived her of her legal rights and unfairly interfered with her ability to raise and educate her daughter. L also contested the award of the redwood furniture set to Z. She claimed this furniture set was marital property and should be divided as such.
In response, Z's lawyer (a woman) filed papers arguing that the award of the redwood furniture was fair, because the furniture was valued at 40,950 yuan and Z had been ordered to give L 20,000 yuan in compensation. As for the division of housing, Z's lawyer made several arguments. First, she argued that in this situation, Y's legal interest was separate from Z's. Y, she said, was a separate family unit, and thus must be awarded housing independently of Z. Z's lawyer argued that the southwest room should not be considered part of the marital property, but rather Y's property, because Y had lived in that room since 1934. A letter from the residence committee, a neighbor's testimony, and Y's own testimony were submitted as supporting evidence.
Second, Z's lawyer argued that Z must be awarded the north room because the north and the southwest rooms were connected, forcing one to walk through the southwest room to get to the north room. Because Y required constant medical attention, the lawyer argued that Z must live in the room closest to Y in order to care for her. Finally, Z and his lawyer argued that since L had been maltreating Y for the past few years, it would be impractical to put her in the room next to Y's. Z also argued that he should be allowed to remain in the southwest room, since he had lived in that room since the two were married. Z's final argument asserted that if L argued that the property division would [Vol. 15: 99
Shaping Citizenship harm her ability to raise her daughter, the court should award custody to Z, who would not seek any child support from L.
Upon appeal, the Shanghai intermediate court re-investigated the case. Hearings were held on April 15, 1998, and on the following May 13. In both sessions, the judge attempted mediation. No new evidence was submitted. We did not witness the conclusion of these hearings.
At the time of our interview, Z was quite frustrated with the court and the length of the divorce process. He resented having to pay a 50-yuan initial court filing fee and an additional 1450 yuan because the amount of the contested property was high, as well as 800 yuan for the investigation. (The parties would not have to split the fees until the end of the case). He had also expended over 2,000 yuan in lawyer fees to date. While the case was pending, L did not allow him to see his daughter, and when he complained to court, the judge said, "nothing could be done." At the time of the interviews, no decision was in sight. When asked to score the court's work on a scale of one to ten, Z gave the court a score of five.
B. Observations from the Case of Z and L and Other Interviewees
Several observations can be made from this case, which are also supported by the interview and other data. In this case, lengthy and complicated procedures did not seem to deter the parties, contrary to accepted notions that Confucian ideology shuns litigation. The litigation in this case also reflects the changes in the legal system itself. While the case began as a community matter involving mediation and the involvement of the work units, it was subsequently filed in court, where it became more of a private matter between individuals.
In the courts, the work units retained influence, but their role in the process was substantially reduced. The work units primarily served a testamentary function, in which they were called upon to give evidence to a final arbitor, in this case the court itself, rather than acting as the primary problem solvers themselves, as they had in the past. This finding was consistent with the other interviews. In a few cases interviewees expressly mentioned that the work unit had mediated prior to the filing of the divorce petition in court.' 40 In at least 140. See, e.g., interview with S-21 in Shanghai China (May 24, 1998); interview with S-22 in Shanghai, China (May 28, 1998); interview with S-26 in Shanghai, China S-26 (Jun. 2, 1998). Both S-21 and S-22 had marital problems dating from the late 1980s and mentioned mediation by the work units prior to filing of claims. Two interviewees, S-19 and S-29, mentioned work-unit participation in mediation during the court process. Interview with S-1 9 in Shanghai, China (May 24, 1998); interview with S-29 in Shanghai, China (June 4, 1998). one case, the court adjudicated the divorce after a brief one-hour hearing with the parties alone.1 4 1 The process was quick and private.
These examples suggest that at least some individuals are experiencing increased liberation from work-unit control and are instead relying on outside institutions, such as the courts, for dispute resolution. In fact, several litigants mentioned that they preferred to go to court because it could be simpler without the involvement of the work unit. 142 (The court system is technically free of the xieyi divorce requirement that parties petitioning for a divorce submit a letter from their work units or residence committees, although in reality the courts consult the work units regarding housing and other issues.) 143 Many of our interviewees also stated that divorce should take place between individuals, not collectives. Yet in our interviews, even where the roles of the work units and residence committees were reduced, they were still important. Collective organizations were often called in to give evidence, particularly with reference to the issue of housing,' 4 4 and courts consider their credibility high. 145 It may be that the role of mass organizations is evolving from a role of resolving disputes into one of acting as advocates or witnesses in the court system.
In the Z/L case, the elderly aunt Y's interest was ultimately argued as a separate interest apart from those of the husband and wife. This divorce reflects the increasingly accepted view of the family in China as consisting of a "nuclear family," with the husband and wife as the core. Indeed, the average size of the Chinese family decreased from 4.51 persons per family in 1982 to 3.63 in 1998, with over 76.54% of the families in China comprised of four or fewer persons. 146 Bi-generational families (usually parents with unmarried children) have replaced multi-generational families. 147 In the courts, and in divorce litigation, the relevant interests are those of the individual litigants.
While lawyers represented Z and L, less than half the litigans we interviewed used lawyers for the divorce process. Four of the nine men used 141. Interview with S-24 in Shanghai, China (June 1, 1998) [Vol. 15: 99 lawyers, 148 while seven of the twenty women had legal representation. 149 Unsurprisingly, those involved in more complicated and contested divorces sought legal assistance more frequently. Finally, as indicated by Z's rating of the legal process at five out of ten, the level of satisfaction with the legal process by the litigants is mixed. Here, the picture is more nuanced and complex. Interviewees' comments reflected varied perceptions of the efficacy and fairness of the divorce process. Naturally, those who get what they want tend to be more satisfied with the process, while those with problems tend to be less satisfied with the courts. A husband who petitioned three times before getting a divorce was very dissatisfied with the process. IS One woman thought that her husband who was "fierce" had gotten his way, and criticized the judge as simply an administrator who "gave in" to her husband.' 51 A second thought the judge was too "young" and that her "privacy was invaded" by the process. 152 One thought that husband, a cadre, had influenced the judge. 153 Another thought the judge did not treat her well because she was too "fashionable."' ' 54 Perhaps more significant are the reactions to the litigation process of those with favorable outcomes. These comments by both male and female litigants have significant implications for female litigants in court. Interviewees with varying outcomes commented that their judge seemed "cold and bureaucratic, ' 55 or was "simply an administrator,' ' 156 with "no understanding.' 57 By contrast, those who were satisfied with their court process commented that their judge was "sympathetic" 18 or "warm.159
These comments could lead to two separate, but perhaps not inconsistent, observations. First, as a whole, the comments expressing dissatisfaction relate more to the professionalism and competence of judges, rather than general dissatisfaction with going to court or viewing adjudication as a personal failure. Second, the basis of these complaints seems to be that judges are either unprofessional or too formal. While some complained that the judges were too young, and didn't understand, 160 others complained that the judge acted "too simply," or "too quickly."' 6 ' These litigants felt that their voices or stories were not heard, and that their participation, as a result, was limited. One must ask then whether the courts and the formal process provide these litigants with a sense of personal integrity and participation in a political system.
Our interviews also suggest that litigants who know what they want or are determined to obtain a specific settlement are more likely to succeed in court. Hence, the female litigants we interviewed who were determined to divorce and who held their ground largely succeeded in obtaining divorces. 162 Litigants who did not or could not hold their ground, however, had to give up property and custody in order to obtain divorces. 163 Finally, a word needs to be said about formal mediation. Mediation is still a force in China, although its venues of importance are shifting from informal mass organizations to the courts. Thus, while informal mediation by residence committees and work units has declined, formal mediation in the courts continues.' 64 While the number of adjudicated divorces is increasing, most divorces still must first go through mediation, and the number of mediated divorces remains large.
VII. LIMITATIONS OF A MARKET BASED LEGAL SYSTEM
Encouragingly, Chinese women are litigating in the courts, often against the odds, suggesting complex calculations on the part of female litigants and an interesting and changing role for courts in China. The litigation of divorce cases can be seen in the context of civil litigation generally. Increasingly, the Chinese state is encouraging the use of courts, which it sees as integral to a stable society and consistent with its goal of reining in local bureaucrats. In 1996, the Supreme People's Court decreed that Chinese courts should "further improve the work of trying civil cases, protect the civil rights and interests of citizens and legal persons according to the law, and promote the just, safe, civilized, and healthy development of society." 165 This is certainly a far cry from the sentiments of 1950s, when disputes were directed away from the formal legal system and handled informally. China recently has been experimenting with aspects of the adversarial system's focus on individual party autonomy as a supplement to its inquisitorial, civil-law-based legal system. To improve the working of courts, China is moving from its traditional priority of substance over procedure to a more concrete focus on court process. 166 While the first ten years (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) of China's legal reforms saw the enactment of primarily substantive legislation, the next ten years saw greater attention being paid to the improvement of the legal process itself. 167 Thus, in recent years, law enforcement has become more focused on the individual, with a reduction in state intervention and an increased reliance on the market to provide legal services and on individuals to assert their rights. Revised court procedures place increasing responsibility on individual litigants to bring and prove a case. 168 Moving away from the civil-law inquisitorial tradition, Chinese law reforms specifically place the burden of presenting a case on individual litigants, rather than on the judge (and hence, the state).1 69 The policy slogan in the Chinese courts is now dangshiren zhuyi [litigant's choice].
A. The Problem of Individual Responsibility for Rights Assertion and Gender
Placing the responsibility for asserting their rights on individual litigants may mean the development of greater rights consciousness, but it can present special problems for those without power. Indeed, without financial resources or legal knowledge, it is difficult for litigants to navigate the judicial system, understand how to obtain proof, or even know what proof is necessary. In the context of divorce cases, this latest change may be most problematic for female litigants whose wealthy husbands attempt to hide family assets from the divorcing wife and the purvey of the court. Institutional barriers may prevent even the most knowledgeable female litigant from advancing her claim of hidden assets within the courts. Even if a female litigant procures legal assistance, she must meet a stringent, often impossible, burden of proof before the courts will act on a hidden asset claim.1 7 In at least one case, the burden of another daring step towards court reform by issuing a five-year plan. The five-year plan outlined a series of reforms to take place during the years 1999 to 2004, which ranged from reforming the process of adjudication to reorganizing the judicial personnel in adjudication. As a policy document, the fiveyear plan identified goals that ranged from the specific to the general and authorized lower courts to experiment with methods to attain them. The plan, therefore, stands as an interesting documentation of the direction of Chinese legal reforms.
167 proof on an individual spouse (even with a lawyer's assistance) to prove that the husband hid assets proved overwhelming.'1 7 As the defendant in this divorce, the female litigant was awarded furniture (a bed and a table) and reallocated a small room for housing, but was otherwise left destitute. 171 Moreover, the changing role of judges in China complicates female litigants' abilities to prevail in hidden assets claims. Previously, Chinese judges controlled the investigation, learned about the parties and the facts, and educated "wrongful parties" when necessary. Today, judges serve less as educators or counselors intent on resolving contradictions, and more as arbiters in the resolution of a dispute brought before them. 73 By placing greater responsibilities on individual litigants, the Chinese legal system is relying more on the market to provide justice and less on the state to step in to alleviate power differentials between litigants.1 74 As a result, lawyers have complained of the lack of remedies afforded by judges. Judges are powerless to order compliance by a defendant in the enforcement of a judgment, and are sometimes unable to require a defendant to appear in court to answer a complaint. 75 In some instances, some judges have taken initial steps toward judicially created remedies. For example, since the temporary right of residence provided by Chinese regulations is dependent on eight or more years of marriage and limited to two years duration, women facing divorce are still disadvantaged and face eventual homelessness. 76 171. Interview with S-9, supra note 3. 172. Id. 173. See interview with S-5, supra note 105 (complaining that "judges don't explain why, they just ask questions and issue a decision."); interview with S-8, supra note 2 (describing the role of the court as limited and noting that the judge did no mediation or investigation). But see interview with S-17, supra note 155 (stating that the judge had advised the wife to ask for property, but she refused, fearing that it would slow down the divorce).
174. In interviews conducted by the author in 1998, Chinese judges express the view that their role is limited to upholding the letter of the law, rather than advising against the wisdom of a negotiated settlement. According to Chinese legal scholars, lawyers in China hesitate to take on divorce cases, viewing them as unprofitable and difficult to resolve., 79 The litigants we interviewed expressed conflicting attitudes toward lawyers and the legal profession. Some of the interviewees did not believe that lawyers were of any help,"O while others reported lawyers to be of great help, particularly on issues of property division. 18 Nevertheless, for the individuals currently appearing before the courts, lawyers serve as crucial intermediaries between the state and the individual. In this reform era, in which "whoever raises the issue has the burden of producing the evidence," lawyers are increasingly needed to gather evidence, build cases, and negotiate settlements.1 82
B. China's Dearth of Lawyers and Legal Services and its Effect on Women
As of 2000, China boasted some 150,000 lawyers, an increase from 3,000 lawyers in 1982an insignificant number in comparison to a population of 1.22 billion.' 83 Women constitute a fast-growing percentage of the profession, but as of 2000, only 50,000 or so women were lawyers, comprising only 20% of the legal profession nationally,' 84 and 30% in Beijing.' 85 This is a vast improvement since 1992, when there were only 4,512 female lawyers.' 8 6
More problematic is the maldistribution of legal services over China's vast geography and over legal specialties. Lawyers still appear in only a small percentage of civil cases in the first instance.' 87 Since marriage and family cases are not as profitable as commercial cases, some participants in the legal system believe the marketplace of legal services has resulted in fewer lawyers going into this area. 88 Hence, even with the growth of the number of lawyers, there remains a tremendous dearth of lawyers for female litigants in need. To make matters worse, while a sizable number of lawyers are found in urban areas such as Shanghai, lawyers are scarce commodities in rural areas. For example, while there are 3,522 full-time lawyers in the city of Shanghai alone, there are only 1,220 lawyers in the entire province of Guizhou. 89 Allowing the market to determine the distribution of legal services may result in a maldistribution ofjustice.
C. Reforms and Remedies
In 1999, in order to enable access to justice, the Supreme People's Court implemented procedures to waive filing fees and other litigation costs. 90 There have also been efforts to establish a nationwide legal aid system and hotline.' 9 1 However, full legal aid programs have been concentrated thus far in economically developed areas, such as Guangdong Province, leaving the rural poor still in need. 9 The All China Women's Federation has attempted to alleviate this dilemma by providing counsel and advice through its legal departments. 93 
VIII. IMPACT OF THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION ON WOMEN
As Inga Markavitiz observes, the transition process from socialism to capitalism is an exchange of legal paradigms, with "state property replaced by private property; the plan by contracts; utopian hopes for substantive justice by a pragmatic reliance on procedure; collective man by the rights bearing individual."' 98 In the context of China, the transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy has resulted in change at the most fundamental level.
In the market-oriented economic era of the 1990s, China witnessed an increase in formal civil litigation and in the privatization of family and personal relations, as female litigants turned to the courts in petitioning for divorces. The formal legal process, more than informal mediation, focuses on the assertion of private, individual rights. Since adjudication captures moments of conflict and the institutional and social content of these moments, it is not only a source of private dispute resolution, but also a process by which public rights are determined and articulated.' 99 Chinese litigants, and especially Chinese women, have taken advantage of these moments. However, as so often happens when change is brought about on an individual basis, women are at a disadvantage.
Now that state structures that once militated against 195. The Wuhan clinic advised over 8000 clients in 300 cases, offering services in five areas of specialization: women, children, disabled people, older people, and administrative cases, the latter involving disputes with governmental bodies. discrimination have been dismantled, women may be left hostage to the prevailing gender bias. Today, Chinese women are initiating divorces and exercising their rights under the Marriage Law. In so doing, they speak a new, personal language of "self-fulfillment" and express the view that divorce and marriage are private matters between two parties. Thus, they seek divorces when "emotions are broken," trying to avoid the prying eyes of the work unit and other collectivist organizations.
The court process, in turn, treats women and men as autonomous individuals. Increasingly, Chinese judges are conducting fewer and fewer investigations, relying more on individual litigants to supply proof, and not ordinarily questioning the fairness of mediated outcomes.
In this way, then, the divorce process has not necessarily increased women's well-being. Since women on average face unequal economic powers and have fewer resources to make their stories heard, the movement toward a more adversarial system and the placement of burdens of proof on individual parties may not have worked to the advantage of most women. They face husbands hiding assets, the danger of being left homeless, and pressure to give up custody and property in the hopes of obtaining a simpler divorce. In the divorce litigation process, female litigants can face an uphill battle.
A. 2001 Marriage Law Amendments
Will women continue to utilize the rights accorded to them by the legal system? Will the system operate effectively to protect their rights? Some answers may be provided by the 2001 amendment to the Marriage Law. In China, state policies toward marriage reform and the dissolution of marriage have matched each period of social and political change. In the 1950s, the Marriage Law was heralded in to destroy the feudal establishment and reestablish the new socialist citizen. In 1980, the Marriage Law was again revised to redress the past abuses of the Cultural Revolution, and then operated together with changing economic policies to foster increasing use of the courts. The most recent ammendment of the Marriage Law, in 2001 perhaps reacted to the privatization of family and personal relations.
The new law, originally drafted by family law scholars, was unprecedented in terms of the quantity of public debate and comments solicited prior to its enactment by the NPC. The Women's Federation was a leading force in its adoption. The 2001 Marriage Law clarified the grounds for divorce, defined what constitutes marital property rights, 2 0 and identified parental custody and visitation rights.
200. The Marriage Law (2001) provides that prenuptial property remains the individual property of the husband or wife, and lists the property acquired during the period of the marriage as joint property (this includes wages and bonuses; proceeds of production and business; proceeds of intellectual Significantly, the 2001 amended Marriage Law attempted to address some areas where women had faced problems within the operation of the 1980 Marriage Law. In many ways, the amended law reverts back to a more moralistic fault-based system with a renewed focus on collectivist mechanisms. So, for example, the 2001 Marriage Law provides for punishment of a party who attempts to conceal joint property to prevent a fair division of property in divorce, and further, allows a party without fault the right to request compensation from a spouse who has committed bigamy, illegal cohabitation, family violence, or desertion. 20 1 In a tone that is reminiscent of the collectivist era, one commentator noted that this provision is necessary because "marriage and family" are the "cell" of society, and its "stability is foundational to society's stability., 20 2 Interestingly, there are also procedural provisions of the new law that augur a return to community control mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, the 2001 Marriage Law deals squarely for the first time with domestic violence. Significantly, the provision brings the issue of domestic violence into the public sphere and places it within the authority of the courts. Judges can no longer hide behind the old proverb, "qingguan nanduan jia wushi," (even the wisest judge cannot rule on family matters). In redressing domestic violence, the 2001 Marriage Law emphasizes both collectivist and state remedies. Victims of domestic violence can petition to relevant organizations, such as residence committees and work units, for mediation, or alternatively, may seek criminal 203 prosecution.
While Chinese women facing domestic violence may seek the intervention of social organizations, they have to accept the accompanying influence of those organizations on the results in their cases.
The 2001 Marriage Law may be one measure by which the Chinese State attempts to swing the pendulum back from a more individualist focus to a more collectivist one. Whether the amended Marriage Law proves to be more effective in protecting women's rights, however, will depend on whether and how women continue to use the courts to protect their rights and whether the courts will in fact provide protection of those rights.
IX. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, formal law and legal procedures by themselves are insufficient.
China must determine what priority it will give to equality, women's rights protections, and other redistributive goals, even when these goals conflict with other state goals, such as economic development and nation-building. China's social priorities are especially tested when the hierarchy of conflicting social goals is determined through the enforcement of formal legal provisions.
There is also room for greater institutional support for the enforcement of existing enacted equality rights. There must be greater legal aid assistance and other safety-net organizations. The present distribution of legal services presents clear obstacles to the assertion of rights. The opportunity to assert ights should not be determined by markets or geography, but rather by concepts of justice.
China, like other transitional economies, faces the flip side of development, with widening income gaps and increased social stability. Greater access to legal aid and the availability of means of redress under the law are critical to ensure equal assertions of rights and claims to justice. Additional legal education programs are needed, not only to determine what women's substantive rights are, but also to how to enforce them. Such programs should be addressed not only to Chinese women, but also to the entire legal system. Indeed, the market will not provide any greater protection for women unless old social institutions adopt new practices, or newly-established social institutions become more conducive to rights assertion and the continuing recognition of the importance of equality. True legal reforms cannot take place until the culture of legal rights and the enforcement of these rights are firmly engrained and entrenched in each and every ordinary citizen.
